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China Sets Oct. 26-29 Dates for CPC's Fifth Plenum in Beijing, With Party Discipline Center Stage
Reporter 欧亚时报编辑部
Xinhua reported that the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee convened on September 21 and decided that the Fifth Plenary Session of the 20th CPC Central Committee would be held in Beijing from October 26 to 29, 2026. CPC General Secretary Xi Jinping presided over the meeting. The decision formally confirmed the dates and venue that had been tentatively set at a Political Bureau meeting on July 30, which first announced that the plenum would convene in Beijing in October.
According to the official communique, the plenum's agenda centers on two items: first, the Political Bureau will report on its work to the Central Committee; second, the session will deliberate the draft "Decision of the CPC Central Committee on Several Major Issues Concerning Persistently Advancing Full and Rigorous Governance of the Party." The September 21 meeting reviewed feedback gathered on the draft decision from within and outside the Party, and resolved to revise it based on that input before formally submitting it to the Fifth Plenum for deliberation.
The Political Bureau gave the draft decision a strongly positive assessment, saying it "realistically summarizes the achievements and experience of full and rigorous Party governance in the new era," offers a thorough analysis of the challenges facing Party building in the current and coming period, and lays out a strategic plan for sustaining strict Party discipline. The meeting stressed that the document carries major practical significance and long-term guiding value for advancing the great new project of Party building and for rallying the Chinese people behind the drive for national rejuvenation through Chinese-style modernization.
Placing Party discipline at the center of this plenum's agenda comes against the backdrop of an unusually intense year of anti-corruption enforcement. On January 24, 2026, China's Ministry of National Defense took the rare step of announcing that Zhang Youxia, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and Liu Zhenli, a CMC member and Chief of the Joint Staff Department, had been placed under investigation for "serious violations of discipline and law." Zhang, who was still a sitting member of the Political Bureau, was the highest-ranking military officer investigated since the 20th Party Congress. The National People's Congress Standing Committee subsequently voted on August 28 to remove Zhang from his post as CMC Vice Chairman and strip him of his NPC delegate status. On September 21 — the same day the Political Bureau reviewed the draft discipline decision — Zhang was expelled from the Party and the military, with his case referred to military prosecutors.
The cases of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli were not isolated. Just before the Fourth Plenum convened, the Ministry of National Defense announced on October 17, 2025 that He Weidong, a former CMC Vice Chairman, and eight other generals had been expelled from the Party and the military for serious disciplinary and legal violations, with their cases referred to military prosecutors. The others disciplined in the same batch included Miao Hua, former head of the CMC Political Work Department; He Hongjun, its former deputy head; Wang Xiubin, former deputy director of the CMC Joint Operations Command Center; Lin Xiangyang, former commander of the Eastern Theater Command; Qin Shutong, former political commissar of the Army; Yuan Huazhi, former political commissar of the Navy; Wang Houbin, former commander of the Rocket Force; and Wang Chunning, former commander of the People's Armed Police. Hong Kong media reported that this was the largest single batch of generals expelled from the Party and military since the reform era began, and the first time a sitting CMC Vice Chairman had been disciplined while still in office; as a consequence, 27 of the military's 42 Central Committee members — a 63% absence rate, including 22 full generals — were absent from the Fourth Plenum.
The intensity of the anti-graft campaign is also visible in the numbers. According to the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) and the National Supervisory Commission, discipline and supervisory authorities nationwide disciplined 983,000 people in 2025, a record high, including 69 officials at or above the provincial/ministerial level; a further 115 senior officials were put under investigation, along with 5,016 at the bureau level. The CCDI's own work report to its Fifth Plenary Session disclosed that 181 "centrally managed cadres" were investigated in 2025 — nearly double the 92 recorded in 2024. The pace has not slowed in 2026: Caixin reported that 30 provincial/ministerial-level officials were placed under investigation in the first quarter alone, compared with 16 in the same period of 2024 and 13 in 2025.
Speaking at the CCDI's Fifth Plenary Session in January, Xi Jinping described the fight against corruption as "a major struggle that must not and cannot be lost," warning that the situation remains "severe and complex" and that the task of eliminating the soil and conditions that breed corruption remains "arduous." Analysts have also noted that 2026 is a year of widespread local leadership turnover across China, prompting particular emphasis from the top leadership on guarding against risks during the transition.
In terms of the institutional thread, the decision now headed for the Fifth Plenum builds directly on the "system for full and rigorous Party governance" that Xi Jinping laid out at a Political Bureau study session in June 2024. That framework was organized around five pillars — organizational, educational, oversight, institutional and accountability systems — calling for a well-functioning organizational system that runs from top to bottom, an oversight mechanism that integrates "not daring, not able, and not wanting" to engage in corruption, and clear accountability lines assigning primary responsibility to Party committees, oversight responsibility to discipline inspection bodies, and first-line responsibility to Party secretaries. This "five-systems" framework was the concrete vehicle for the Third Plenum's decision on deepening reform of Party-building institutions, and it now forms the institutional basis for the draft decision heading to the Fifth Plenum.
Under CPC convention, the Central Committee elected at the 20th Party Congress has now convened five plenary sessions. The Fourth Plenum, held October 20-23, 2025, adopted the "Recommendations of the CPC Central Committee for Formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan," a document drafted over more than eight months under a group personally led by Xi Jinping; the National People's Congress approved the resulting Five-Year Plan outline, covering 2026-2030, on March 12, 2026. In contrast to the Fourth Plenum's focus on economic and social development, the upcoming Fifth Plenum turns its agenda entirely to the Party's own governance — widely seen as a formal political response to the string of major disciplinary and legal cases that have surfaced this year.
The July 30 Political Bureau meeting, besides setting the plenum's date and venue, also reviewed the current economic situation and laid out priorities for economic work in the second half of 2026, leaving room for economic issues to surface at the plenum as well. The final text of the discipline decision is expected to be released as a communique once the plenum concludes; the follow-up work of building out supporting Party regulations will be a key indicator of whether this sustained push for stricter Party governance translates into concrete results.
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